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“The emptiness of this stage signifies nothing:” The 




Theatre is an art form which has often been defined by its materiality. The things that 
are represented on the stage are very frequently the objects that are actually used to 
represent them; the human body, chairs and tables and much else besides may be 
materially present on the stage. In very general terms, this material basis of stage 
 representation seems to distinguish theatrical experience from reading a novel or 
watching film. Characters onstage speak from and move around particular points in 
space, whereas those on film or in novels do not impose themselves on specific spatial 
points beyond the screen or the page. That said, the audience’s relationship to the 
stage’s materiality has been theorised in many different ways. In this paper, I would 
like to examine some different approaches to theorising materiality on the stage, and 
to suggest how some modernist theatrical practices have pre-figured a semiotic 
understanding of the object as sign. While charting the relationship between 
modernist stagecraft and materiality would be a considerable undertaking, I am setting 
out to reflect broadly on some conceptions of the material, before turning to my 
central example, Peter Handke’s play Offending the Audience.  
 
There has been a long-standing tradition within the theatre that distrusts, or is 
uncomfortable with the stage’s materiality. The playwright Eugene Ionesco, described 
his uneasiness with theatre’s materiality with the admission  
 
it was the presence on the stage of flesh-and-blood people that embarrassed 
me. Their material presence destroyed the fiction. I was confronted, as it were, 
by two planes of reality—the concrete, material, impoverished, empty, limited 
reality of these living, everyday human beings, moving about and talking on 
the stage, and the reality of the imagination, the two face to face and not 
coinciding, unable to be brought into relation with each other; two antagonistic 
worlds incapable of being unified, of merging. (Ionesco cited in Esslin 1980: 
137)    
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Such is Ionesco’s apparent disdain for the “material,” it may be surprising, given this 
statement, that Ionesco was to become famed for his plays, part of a tradition to which 
Martin Esslin has attached the generic term ‘Theatre of the Absurd’.1 This uneasiness 
with materiality has a long tradition the theatre. In his treatise on drama, Aristotle 
clearly prioritises the importance of the poet’s text over the physical circumstances of 
its enactment. In the nineteenth century, a number of English critics held that 
Shakespeare’s plays were experienced more authentically through the act of reading 
than the act of performance. The relationship between what Ionesco calls ‘the reality 
of the imagination’ and the reality of the ‘everyday human beings’ who move about 
the stage, has been a source of difficulty in establishing theatre’s aesthetic credentials. 
However, Ionesco’s view of theatre’s materiality-as-crude helped to shape his stage 
aesthetic. Far from trying to conceal the stage’s materiality, or simply writing novels 
or directing films instead, Ionesco used the stage’s crudity to his advantage. He saw 
that the stage could create enlarged and exaggerated pictures of the world precisely 
because of its material ungainliness. In his play Rhinoceros, there is no attempt to 
conceal an element of the ridiculous implicit in actors pretending to be characters 
onstage; most of the characters in the play turn into rhinoceroses. Theatre seemed 
perfect to Ionesco for representing the grotesque. His aim was to ‘create a theatre of 
violence—violently comic, violently dramatic’ (1980: 142).  
 
In the context of artistic modernism, of which Ionesco could be said to belong, 
theatre’s materiality became an especially important issue for twentieth century 
theatre-makers. Throughout the arts, modernist artists were investigating the 
distinctive and ‘essential’ qualities of their chosen art forms, and many theatre 
practitioners were doing the same. The development and increasing popularity of film 
injected a sense of urgency into investigations of theatre’s distinctiveness. The 
material foundation of theatrical representation became a key concern. Polish theatre 
auteur Jerzy Grotowski theorised and put into practice an aesthetic that posited 
materiality as the essence of theatre: 
 
                                                          
1
 Martin Esslin  applied the epithet “Theatre of the Absurd” to a number of post-war playwrights in a 
book of the same title, first published in 1961. Esslin argued that a number of playwrights, including 
Samuel Beckett, Arthur Adamov, Jean Genet, Harold Pinter—and Ionesco—shared a belief that the 
human condition is irrational, their plays reflecting a wider loss of faith in the progression and 
purposefulness of mankind. 
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By gradually eliminating whatever proved superfluous, we found that theatre 
can exist without make-up, without autonomic costume and scenography, 
without a separate performance area (stage), without lighting and sound 
effects etc. It cannot exist without the actor-spectator relationship of 
perceptual, direct, “live” communion. (Grotowski 1991: 19)    
 
Grotowski’s conception of the ‘Poor Theatre’ reflects a wish both to emphasise the 
direct immediacy implied by the ‘perceptual, direct’ actor-audience relationship, 
while simultaneously paring away the unnecessarily ‘showy’ aspects of theatrical 
display. Much of what Grotowski sought to ‘eliminate’ included those elements that 
were most likely to draw a spectator’s attention away from the experience of the 
actor’s presence. In much conventional drama, make-up, autonomous costume and 
self-contained stage-space, are among the traditional means for theatre to exhibit or 
represent characters and narratives, drawing the spectator’s attention to some “other” 
fictional world and away from the immediacy of the performance event.2 By getting 
rid of what he saw as unnecessary clutter on the stage, the core actor-audience 
relationship would be revealed as the foundation stone of Grotowski’s theatre.  
 
Grotwoski and Ionesco represent two contrasting attitudes to the materiality of 
the stage. Ionesco confesses to having been embarrassed by “the presence on stage of 
flesh-and-blood people,” yet for this very reason he sought to accentuate it. 
Grotowski, however, saw in materiality a path to theatre’s salvation in the face of 
what he saw as film and television’s vulgarity. Yet Grotowski preferred to pare 
theatrical representation down to the minimum, to create what he described as a 
“holy” exchange between actor and audience. However, while Ionesco and Grotowski 
disagreed about what theatre should be for and what theatre should be like, they seem 
to have shared a view that the perceptual relationship between an audience and the 
actors and materials on the stage, is direct and unmediated. Theatre’s distinctiveness, 
by this account, is founded on the material reality of the medium; being so much more 
than words on a page, or images on a screen.  
 
                                                          
2
 While the Polish Laboratory Theatre did stage productions in which the actors worse specially 
selected “costume” , Grotowski’s aversion towards “autonomous costume” relates more to the use of 
costumes as an external indicator of character. Thus, in the production of Akropolis (1966), all the 
actors were dressed in simple sack-cloth, allowing greater focus on the internal processes of actorly 
revelation as opposed to the outward illustration of “character”. 
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Running parallel to those aspects of modernist theatre which prioritised 
materiality and presence, was a developing set of ideas and practices that would 
challenge the notion of a direct and unmediated stage-audience relationship. In the 
1970’s and 1980’s, semiotics, or the study of signs, was increasingly being explored 
as a way of analysing theatrical performance. Keir Elam’s book The Semiotics of 
Theatre and Drama became the first comprehensive text on the subject to be 
published in English in 1980. However, as far back as the 1930’s and 1940’s, a group 
known as The Prague School Structuralists was already applying semiotic principles 
to theatre analysis. Their first principle theorised the semioticisation of everything on 
the stage. An object, or an actor’s body onstage, when analysed semiotically is not, as 
Ionesco described, “impoversished” and “empty,” but charged with meaning. 
Semiotic discourse would propose that, when watching a piece of theatre, the 
audience do not merely see objects and actors, but an array of theatrical signs which 
are constantly conveying meaning(s). The semiotic approach to performance analysis 
tends to highlight “textuality” over materiality; in reading the theatrical sign, the 
spectator’s attention will be drawn towards conditions and references external to the 
theatre event itself.  As Colin Counsell offers a general explanation of reading the 
“cultural text”:  
 
When reading any cultural text—a play, painting or poster—we do not 
spontaneously create a means of interpreting it but employ the instruments our 
culture makes available. We call on our experience of other texts; not only 
simply other plays, paintings and posters, but discourses and sign systems, 
iconographies and ideologies, using their logics to weave the work’s parts into 
a single whole. (Counsell 1996: 14) 
 
 
Such an approach to theatre analysis seems to direct our attention away from the 
direct materiality of the performance event. While Grotowski’s conception of theatre 
was predicated on revealing “the actor-spectator relationship of perceptual, direct, 
‘live’ communion” (Grotowski 1991: 19), the focus of semiotics leans towards the 
“discourses” and “sign systems” which surround the theatrical experience.  
 
By no means all modernist theatre practitioners worked against the grain of 
semiotic theory, however. For the later French structuralist Roland Barthes, no-one 
understood the stage as a semiotic structure better than the Marxist playwright Bertolt 
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Brecht. Barthes noted Brecht’s contribution in the following terms: “what Brechtian 
dramaturgy postulates is that today at least, the responsibility of a dramatic art is not 
so much to express reality as to signify it” (Barthes 1972: 74). While Brecht was not 
directly influenced by semiotics, his approach to staging involved bringing to light the 
processes of representation. Brecht’s Epic Theatre, with the stylistic employment of 
placards, open lighting, minimal stage décor and the half curtain, lent the stage, in 
Bert States’ phrase, a “provisional quality” (States 1985: 93). Like the actors whose 
task was to reveal a range of choices faced by the character rather than pre-determined 
action, the stage would explore constructions of reality and their ideological subtexts. 
While Grotowski and Ionesco saw the stage-audience relationship as founded on a 
direct materiality, Brecht’s theatre tended to see that relationship as ideologically 
charged. At the heart of Brecht’s conception of theatre is that the relationship between 
stage and auditorium is inherently politicised. Brecht’s verfremdungseffekt (or 
“estrangement” devices), sought to emphasise the importance of spectatorial 
consciousness and control over theatre’s potential to construct illusions, referring to 
the construction of the “partial illusion”:  
 
Too much heightening of the illusion in the setting, together with a “magnetic” 
way of acting that gives the spectator the illusion of being present at a fleeting, 
accidental, “real” event, create such an impression of naturalness that one can 
no longer impose one’s judgement, imagination or reactions, and must simply 
conform by sharing in the experience and becoming one of “nature’s” objects. 
The illusion created by theatre must be a partial one, in order that it may 
always be recognised as an illusion. Reality, however complete, has to be 
altered by being turned into art, so that it can be seen to be alterable and be 
treated as such. (Brecht 1964: 219) 
 
By envisaging the “partial illusion,” which would allow the audience to experience 
not only a fictional stage scenario but also notice its construction as theatre, Brecht 
hoped to empower his audience to “interpose [their] judgement, imagination or 
reactions.” Recognising the spectator’s reason and capacity for rational judgement 
could be undermined by the fictional-making potentials of the stage and thus into 
irrelevant emotional attachments to the fortunes of stage characters, Brecht affirmed 
the materiality of the theatre-making process. Rather than being swept-away into an 
unfolding story, Brechtian stagecraft aimed to keep its audience alert to each moment 
in performance, and the political implications of the action onstage. 
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Brecht recognised theatre’s materiality as a constituent of the stage’s 
signification process. However, there is a potential danger in thinking that the 
employment of Brechtian techniques inherently politicises the stage-auditorium 
relationship in a way that remains fixed and pre-determined. After a time, the 
audience may experience less the materiality of the stage and the processes of 
representation, and more a pre-established idea of “classic” Brecthain stagecraft. 
Theatre theorist Jon Erickson notes a potential difficulty with the systematic use of 
Brechtian “alienation effects;” alienation is “a difficult task in the theatre, where 
image always becomes the dominant factor, and where…alienation effects in time 
become conventionalised images” (Erickson 1994: 61). In other words, theatrical 
signs do not merely point towards an external referent, but also to their own 
production. On one level at least, theatrical conventions signify themselves; even the 
most naturalistically detailed set can intrigue the eye since it may represent not only a 
nineteenth century living room, but also its own painstaking meticulous staging.  
 
If Brechtian techniques do lead to “conventionalised images” as Erickson 
suggests, then we might say that the half curtain and placards are serving excellently 
at “playing” a Brecht set. There is a danger that Brecht’s “defamiliarisation” 
techniques can start to look all too familiar and clichéd. As Bert States observed, at a 
Brecht production “I can still say to myself: ‘That actor is doing a good job. He has 
the Brecht style down to a pat.’ In other words, theatre is theatre” (States 1985: 94).3 
The materiality of the stage is not experienced in the direct way that Grotowski or 
Ionesco envisaged, nor does the predetermined conception and deployment of 
verfremdungseffekt necessarily provoke a more reasoned, rational judgement from its 
audiences than other styles of presentation. The stage’s materiality is not a transparent 
medium through which ideas are communicated to an audience; the medium itself 
becomes part of the signification process.  A question arises from this. If the stage and 
its objects are already encoded as signs, then does that mean that materiality can no 
longer be seen as a defining theatrical attribute? 
 
                                                          
3
 For an examination of attempts to reconfigure Brechtian stagecraft on the British stage in the 1990s, 
see Margaret Eddershaw’s Performing Brecht: Forty Years of British Performances (1996), pp. 151-
157. 
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To pursue this question, I would like to introduce by way of example, Peter 
Handke’s 1966 play Offending the Audience. In this play, a relationship between 
materiality and the sign is a source of constant tension. Handke specifies that the 
“usual theatre atmosphere should prevail” as the audience enter the auditorium, but 
that the ushers should be “more assiduous than usual, even more formal and 
ceremonious.” From behind the curtain, Handke further suggests that the audience 
should hear noises that make them believe that scenery is being moved into position. 
When the curtain slowly rises however, the “four speakers,” dressed casually, step 
forward onto an empty stage. Much of the play consists of these four speakers issuing 
a series of denials and negations of the theatrical situation:  
 
 
This room does not make-believe it is a room. The side that is open to you is 
not the fourth wall of a house. The world does not have to be cut open 
here...This is no drama. No action that has occurred elsewhere is represented 
here. Only a now and a now and a now exist here. This is no make-believe 
which re-enacts an action that really happened once upon a time. Time plays 
no role here. We are not acting out a plot. Therefore we are not playing time. 
Time is for real here, it expires from one word to the next. (Handke 1971: 19, 
21)   
 
 
The dialogue seems to have two simultaneous effects on the audience’s experience of 
materiality. On one level, the dialogue dematerialises the stage by relentlessly telling 
the audience that there is nothing in particular to see. However, the dialogue also 
seems to affirm the basic materiality of the theatrical situation. There may be no 
drama, no props, no plot, but there is—or seems to be—a clear and immediate 
relationship between the stage and the auditorium. Both possibilities are implicit 
within the following piece of dialogue:  
 
The emptiness of the stage is no picture of another emptiness. The emptiness 
of this stage signifies nothing. This stage is empty because objects would be in 
our way. It is empty because we don’t need objects. This stage represents 
nothing. It represents no other emptiness. This stage is empty. (1971: 16) 
 
Even as the dialogue posits nothingness and the apparent unmediated immediacy of 
the stage, this emptiness is communicating information to the audience. An 
audience’s temptation is to “fill in the blanks” when confronted by minimal stage 
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décor. If a chair is placed on a bare stage, in the imaginations of the audience, it can 
signify an office or a throne room. If an actor walks onto a bare stage, his costume 
and manner of walking will give clues as to the fictional environment within which 
the character is operating. By telling us that there is no such fictional environment, 
Handke’s Speakers focus attention directly on themselves and the theatrical situation 
in which they address the audience.  
 
However, the apparently direct material relationship is also undercut by the 
play’s design. The emptiness stage is pointedly signifying the absence of props, just 
as the play as a whole signifies the absence of narrative While there is no “world” to 
imagine, the Speakers’ explicit repudiation of representation can in itself be seen as a 
fiction established by the play. Even as they lay claim to an existence in “a now,” they 
are already speaking from within a script and almost certainly within a pre-rehearsed 
routine. The four speakers are already negating their own “immediacy” by entering 
the representational frame of the stage. The irony is that as soon as the curtain is 
raised and the “four speakers” walk out to address the audience, they enter into a zone 
of repetition that fictionalises their immediate material presence.  
 
Even the audience’s material presence and active participation in the theatre 
event is challenged. Near the beginning, the Speakers tell the audience: 
 
You expected something. You expected something else perhaps. You expected 
objects. You expected no objects. You expected an atmosphere. You expected 
a different world. You expected no different world. In any case, you expected 
something. It may be the case that you expected what you are hearing now. 
But even in that case you expected something different. (Handke 1971: 13) 
 
Handke, by drawing attention to the audience’s expectations, shows that the audience 
is already inscribed within the event. The words are not being addressed to the 
specific individuals present in the auditorium on a given night, any more than the 
Speaker’s utterances are identified as the actor’s “own” words. Speech, action and 
spectatorship have already begun before the theatre event begins; the actors and 
audience have gone to the theatre to take on pre-designated roles. Even as the play 
ends on the lines “You are welcome here. We thank you. Goodnight,” the audience is 
not allowed to assume active individual agency. As the Speakers stand and stare into 
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the auditorium, the stage directions indicate that “Roaring applause and wild 
whistling is piped in through the loudspeakers” including “taped audience reactions 
to pop-music concerts” which lasts until the audience begin to leave. The ending 
exposes the illusion of a spontaneous show of appreciation, when actors and audience 
recognise their mutual presence and collaboration in the event. Even as the play seems 
to strip the theatrical situation down to a basic actor-audience foundation, it is as 
though neither actors nor audience are really “there,” but are just passing through. The 
title of the play has therefore a double meaning. Those who have come to watch the 
show are not really being “offended” since the “audience” is of the same fictional 
status as the four speakers. However, if there is an offence in Handke’s theatrical 
conceit, it is in telling the audience that their responses are not entirely their own, that 
they are pre-conditioned by recognised conventions and attitudes. What offence there 
may be in the play is perhaps founded on its paradoxical proposition; that one pre-
condition for causing offence—actors and audience being directly responsive to one 
another—is denied in the first place.  
 
Offending the Audience sets out to demonstrate that theatre is, on one level at 
least, a representation of theatre. A given performance coincides with or subverts a set 
of expectations and assumptions about what theatre is like. In this respect, Handke 
seems to go further in demonstrating the dominance of signs on the stage than Brecht. 
While Brechtian staging is used to investigate social questions outside the theatre, 
Offending the Audience seems to support Elam’s understanding of “theatrical 
semiosis” which  “invariably, and above all, connotes itself” (Elam 1980: 12). The 
material facticity of the theatre event—the arrangement of actors and props onstage 
and the relationship between stage and auditorium—already encodes the theatre as 
theatre. 
 
I opened this paper by suggesting that many conceptions of theatre’s 
distinctiveness as an art form are tied up with notions of materiality. The direct actor-
to-audience relationship that Grotowski spoke of is already encoded and mediated by 
the stage, and by the horizon of expectation an audience brings to the event. Offending 
the Audience is a play which seems to acknowledge the many ways in which signs 
mediate an apparently direct stage-auditorium relationship. Far from showing that the 
search for theatre’s distinctiveness is a red herring however, the play appears to 
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suggest an alternative; namely that theatre’s distinctiveness may lie in how different 
levels of materiality are encoded. While questioning the whole idea of theatre, it is 
clear that Offending the Audience—as a metatheatrical play—relies specifically on its 
theatrical context to realise the full impact of its potential. It is, on some level, about 
what makes theatrical communication distinctive, even as it feigns to repudiate 
everything associated with traditional theatrical performance. “Theatrical pleasure,” 
as Anne Ubersfeld has suggested, “is the pleasure of the sign; it is the most semiotic 
of all pleasures” (Ubersfeld 1982: 129). If everything onstage has a semiotic function, 
then reading the stage event will involve decoding a plethora of visual and aural 
information, possibly occurring at different points on a playing space, at any given 
moment.  
 
One of the peculiarities of theatrical signification is the close material 
relationship that often prevails between sign and signifier. To read theatrical signs 
will typically involve looking at real objects on a stage. A chair onstage is both 
perceived as an object, while it may also be ‘”standing-in-for” an object in a fictional 
universe. Understanding the materiality of the theatrical sign is important to our 
appreciation of certain theatrical effects, especially in relation to the body of the actor. 
As semiotician Umberto Eco explains:  
 
[In theatre] on perceiving a human body, we participate in the semiosic 
process by applying all that we know about the body and all we expect from it: 
hence the sense of wonder (pleasant or irritating, according to our disposition) 
if, by chance, in a theatrical fiction the human body is raised up into the air by 
some hidden contraption, or if a mime makes it move as if it were a 
marionette. (Eco 2000: 376) 
 
 
The notion of a material sign, itself a kind of paradox, is exemplified by theatrical 
representation. Materials such as props, actor’s bodies and even the auditorium itself 
form overlapping combinations of meaning. While an audience may or may not take 
pleasure in being “offended” by Peter Handke, his play does point to theatre as a place 
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